I stumbled onto this purely by accident.
Like the mythical bird, Phoenix, in-flight broadband Internet access may soon rise from the ashes of Connexion by Boeing. Panasonic Avionics Corporation has improved upon Connexion's original concept in its eXconnect offering.
eXconnect improves on Connexion by leasing satellite Internet connectivity, reducing the breakeven point for the service. It also improves speed using newer technology. The airplane antenna is more compact and lighter, saving fuel costs. And Panasonic is looking to partner with existing airport WiFi vendors, so you can pay for your in-flight connection, and use the airport departure lounge WiFi prior to boarding under a single package. Finally, the goal is to start the service at a price similar to Connexion by Boeing, and get the price down to about $20 for the duration of long-distance international flight within a year of launching.
It makes total sense the in-flight entertainment companies are bringing back in-flight broadband, and as any second attempt, it should be faster, smaller, and cheaper.
Now if they would just bring back Concorde.
Links:
Panasonic May Relaunch Connexion
Aircraft Interiors: Panasonic plans broadband launch in fourth quarter
Showing posts with label Commercial Aviation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commercial Aviation. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Wednesday, March 28, 2007
Big Sky Theory
If you are over the Pacific Ocean halfway between Chile and New Zealand, and you get killed by a falling satellite, guess what? It's not your day.
But for these people, as the falling satellite missed them, the "Big Sky" theory continues to hold:
Space junk falls around airliner: report
But for these people, as the falling satellite missed them, the "Big Sky" theory continues to hold:
Space junk falls around airliner: report
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
The airplane that refuses to die
The Boeing 767, that is.
This is an interesting article:
Boeing considering new 767 freighter to counter A330-200F
And an excellent complement at Randy's Blog here:
Year of the 767
Sidebar: Besides Sun CEO Jonathan Schwartz, Randy Baseler, Vice President of Marketing for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, is probably corporate America's highest ranking and best known blogger.
Boeing is considering enhancements to its 767-300 freighter to make it more competitive with the Airbus A330 freighter. Now the 767 is over a decade older than the A330, and the freighter variant of the A330 is a brand-new model of the A330, designed to replace the A300 freighter, itself almost a decade older than the 767.
But it is amazing the 767 is even able to challenge the A330. The A330 is larger, and can carry both more volume and weight. The A330's lower deck is wider, and can carry more and larger containers. That the 767 is still competitive against the larger A330 points to much deeper problems with Airbus. But it also points to a company, Boeing, which is a model of aggressive competitiveness.
The way I describe it is Boeing is able to play chess while simultaneously being involved in a street fight. Playing chess is Boeing accomplishing its strategic plans. The street fight is the daily tactical selling of what Boeing has "on the truck". The chess part is the future: The 787 and the deft move to offer the derivative 747-8. The street fight is today: The numerous 737 variants, the phenomenal 777, and now the possibility of an enhanced 767F. What is interesting is an enhanced 767F could eat into production capacity for the 787, which will be produced in the same Everett Washington facility.
I think Boeing will cross that bridge when they reach it. Today it is about winning.
There are many companies who could learn a thing or two from Boeing's commercial airplane division.
This is an interesting article:
Boeing considering new 767 freighter to counter A330-200F
And an excellent complement at Randy's Blog here:
Year of the 767
Sidebar: Besides Sun CEO Jonathan Schwartz, Randy Baseler, Vice President of Marketing for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, is probably corporate America's highest ranking and best known blogger.
Boeing is considering enhancements to its 767-300 freighter to make it more competitive with the Airbus A330 freighter. Now the 767 is over a decade older than the A330, and the freighter variant of the A330 is a brand-new model of the A330, designed to replace the A300 freighter, itself almost a decade older than the 767.
But it is amazing the 767 is even able to challenge the A330. The A330 is larger, and can carry both more volume and weight. The A330's lower deck is wider, and can carry more and larger containers. That the 767 is still competitive against the larger A330 points to much deeper problems with Airbus. But it also points to a company, Boeing, which is a model of aggressive competitiveness.
The way I describe it is Boeing is able to play chess while simultaneously being involved in a street fight. Playing chess is Boeing accomplishing its strategic plans. The street fight is the daily tactical selling of what Boeing has "on the truck". The chess part is the future: The 787 and the deft move to offer the derivative 747-8. The street fight is today: The numerous 737 variants, the phenomenal 777, and now the possibility of an enhanced 767F. What is interesting is an enhanced 767F could eat into production capacity for the 787, which will be produced in the same Everett Washington facility.
I think Boeing will cross that bridge when they reach it. Today it is about winning.
There are many companies who could learn a thing or two from Boeing's commercial airplane division.
Friday, February 23, 2007
What Boeing Needs To Do (Part 4)
In previous posts, I proposed Boeing split their proposed Y1 project into two aircraft, one in a smaller category, 100-150 seats, and another to target the 180-250 seat market. This article suggests Boeing might do just that:
Boeing may offer two 737 replacement solutions
I also said Boeing needs to act now. Why?
One thing I have learned in business is, companies have the ability to shape the market and drive the behavior of competitors. They also have the ability, through inaction or the wrong actions, to be held hostage to the decisions of competitors.
Airbus is struggling. They are under severe pressure from Boeing in the long-ranged widebody airliner market currently defined by the Boeing 777 and Airbus A330/A340, and the future Boeing 787 and Airbus A350. The success of Boeing's 787 project has put extreme pressure on Airbus. It not only forced them to create an response (the A350), but to scrap the original A350 design and completely redesign it as the A350XWB. Now Airbus has internal problems, as this article covers:
Ex-Airbus boss says EADS structure doomed to fail
Despite these problems, Airbus is quite successful in the medium ranged narrow-bodied market where their A320 aircraft outsells the Boeing 737 about two to one. But larger aircraft are more profitable.
But Boeing has a unique opportunity. Not necessarily to vanquish a competitor (I for one despise monopolies), but to further define the future airliner market. As a result, Boeing can force its primary competitor to either cede a major market segment to Boeing, or force Airbus to further dilute its efforts.
This is why Boeing needs to act now. An aircraft targeting the Boeing 757, Boeing 767-200, and A310 markets would give Boeing a "hammer and anvil" strategy against Airbus. It would limit Airbus' markets or spread it too thin. And it would put Boeing firmly in the driver's seat of the commercial aviation industry.
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3
Boeing may offer two 737 replacement solutions
I also said Boeing needs to act now. Why?
One thing I have learned in business is, companies have the ability to shape the market and drive the behavior of competitors. They also have the ability, through inaction or the wrong actions, to be held hostage to the decisions of competitors.
Airbus is struggling. They are under severe pressure from Boeing in the long-ranged widebody airliner market currently defined by the Boeing 777 and Airbus A330/A340, and the future Boeing 787 and Airbus A350. The success of Boeing's 787 project has put extreme pressure on Airbus. It not only forced them to create an response (the A350), but to scrap the original A350 design and completely redesign it as the A350XWB. Now Airbus has internal problems, as this article covers:
Ex-Airbus boss says EADS structure doomed to fail
Despite these problems, Airbus is quite successful in the medium ranged narrow-bodied market where their A320 aircraft outsells the Boeing 737 about two to one. But larger aircraft are more profitable.
But Boeing has a unique opportunity. Not necessarily to vanquish a competitor (I for one despise monopolies), but to further define the future airliner market. As a result, Boeing can force its primary competitor to either cede a major market segment to Boeing, or force Airbus to further dilute its efforts.
This is why Boeing needs to act now. An aircraft targeting the Boeing 757, Boeing 767-200, and A310 markets would give Boeing a "hammer and anvil" strategy against Airbus. It would limit Airbus' markets or spread it too thin. And it would put Boeing firmly in the driver's seat of the commercial aviation industry.
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3
Monday, January 22, 2007
Delta to acquire 124-seat Boeing 737-700s
Delta's recent decision to acquire 10 Boeing 737-700s configured with 124 seats each confirms my theory in the value of a 110-130 seat aircraft for the major airlines.
Previous Delta aircraft in this category were the Boeing 737-300 and 737-200, both were gained through the acquisition of Western Airlines. Delta later acquired more 737-300s from other carriers. Prior to the 737-200/300s, Delta flew over a hundred DC-9-30s.
While Delta may never fly hundreds of 110-130 seat airliners again, Delta's recent decision shows the gap between the 70-seat regional jets and 150 seat 737-800 is too significant to ignore.
I expect if Delta successfully exits bankruptcy and avoids US Air's hostile takeover attempt, more 737-700s will be ordered in the future.
Previous Delta aircraft in this category were the Boeing 737-300 and 737-200, both were gained through the acquisition of Western Airlines. Delta later acquired more 737-300s from other carriers. Prior to the 737-200/300s, Delta flew over a hundred DC-9-30s.
While Delta may never fly hundreds of 110-130 seat airliners again, Delta's recent decision shows the gap between the 70-seat regional jets and 150 seat 737-800 is too significant to ignore.
I expect if Delta successfully exits bankruptcy and avoids US Air's hostile takeover attempt, more 737-700s will be ordered in the future.
Sunday, December 17, 2006
What Boeing Needs To Do (Part 3)
Assuming as expected, Boeing splits the 100-250 seat aircraft market into two segments with two distinct designs, what should Boeing propose for the 100-150 seat category?
Boeing has to target this aircraft above the Embraer E-190 and E-195 aircraft. This is somewhat eased by U.S. major airline pilots unions, who in their contract cap the largest aircraft a regional partner can use. This "scope clause" is intended to prevent the loss of mainline pilot jobs to lower-paid regional pilots. But is also keeps the 110-130 seat segment firmly with the major airlines, as skipping from 70 seat regional jets to 150 seat mainline aircraft can be to much of a gap to schedule efficiently.
In my last post, I pointed out most domestic first-class passengers don't pay for first class, but instead are coach passengers who are upgraded to first class based on their frequent flier status. This fact makes aircraft like the 767 and MD-80 better for the airlines, because their first class cabins lose only one seat per row. Domestic first class in the 767 uses six-abreast seating compared to seven-abreast in coach. On the MD-80 (and Boeing 717), first class is four-abreast while coach is five-abreast.
If Boeing does create an aircraft to cover the gap between its larger 737s and the 787, that leaves only the lower-end of the 737 market needing a follow-on. An aircraft with a cross-section similar to the MD-80/717 would fit this ideally. In fact, it could easily cover from 100 to 150 passengers. Some improvements could be made, but the current MD-80/717 design is still valid. This aircraft could be timed for a 2015 entry into service, and Boeing could focus on breakthrough engine efficiencies. Range would be less important, as the larger aircraft could address handful of "long thin" routes where longer range 737s are currently being used.
Regarding the MD-80/717 design, a T-tail, rear engine design offers more flexibility for higher bypass engines, or even a rebirth of the "propfans" proposed in the early 1990s.
The five-abreast, single-aisle layout offers faster loading and unloading than the 737s six-abreast single-aisle config. The only negative on this layout is overhead bin space. But there is plenty of time to address the cabin layouts.
For my next post, I will explain why Boeing needs to act now.
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 4
Boeing has to target this aircraft above the Embraer E-190 and E-195 aircraft. This is somewhat eased by U.S. major airline pilots unions, who in their contract cap the largest aircraft a regional partner can use. This "scope clause" is intended to prevent the loss of mainline pilot jobs to lower-paid regional pilots. But is also keeps the 110-130 seat segment firmly with the major airlines, as skipping from 70 seat regional jets to 150 seat mainline aircraft can be to much of a gap to schedule efficiently.
In my last post, I pointed out most domestic first-class passengers don't pay for first class, but instead are coach passengers who are upgraded to first class based on their frequent flier status. This fact makes aircraft like the 767 and MD-80 better for the airlines, because their first class cabins lose only one seat per row. Domestic first class in the 767 uses six-abreast seating compared to seven-abreast in coach. On the MD-80 (and Boeing 717), first class is four-abreast while coach is five-abreast.
If Boeing does create an aircraft to cover the gap between its larger 737s and the 787, that leaves only the lower-end of the 737 market needing a follow-on. An aircraft with a cross-section similar to the MD-80/717 would fit this ideally. In fact, it could easily cover from 100 to 150 passengers. Some improvements could be made, but the current MD-80/717 design is still valid. This aircraft could be timed for a 2015 entry into service, and Boeing could focus on breakthrough engine efficiencies. Range would be less important, as the larger aircraft could address handful of "long thin" routes where longer range 737s are currently being used.
Regarding the MD-80/717 design, a T-tail, rear engine design offers more flexibility for higher bypass engines, or even a rebirth of the "propfans" proposed in the early 1990s.
The five-abreast, single-aisle layout offers faster loading and unloading than the 737s six-abreast single-aisle config. The only negative on this layout is overhead bin space. But there is plenty of time to address the cabin layouts.
For my next post, I will explain why Boeing needs to act now.
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 4
Tuesday, December 05, 2006
What Boeing Needs To Do (Part 2)
Last Friday, December 1st, Airbus finally, officially launched the A350XWB. As I commented earlier, I believe Boeing now should target the 200-250 seat market for its next commercial airliner.
What should a new Boeing 200-250 seat aircraft look like?
A big consideration driving seating arrangements for U.S. domestic airlines is balancing seat revenue with flight attendant requirements. Delta slightly reduced the seating on its 737-800s to 150 seats so they could operate these aircraft with only three flight attendants. 151 passengers requires four flight attendants, as does 200. So a few more fare paying passengers did not offset the added cost of an additional flight attendant. This means Boeing must target designs for 150 seats, 200 seats, and 250 seats in a U.S. domestic two-class arrangement. Alternatively, longer-range international flights have different considerations. This means in a larger, longer-ranged version, total seat numbers are less important.
An almost ideal fuselage for such an airplane would be similar to the proposed Boeing 7J7 and McDonnell Douglas DC-11. Both of these proposed twin-aisle, six-abreast coach configurations.
This seating configuration offers two design options. The first, a narrower option, considers the fact a twin aisle, six-abreat configuration can tolerate narrower seats and aisles. This means the fuselage only has to be about 18 inches wider than the current 737. Despite narrow seats and aisles, with 2/3rds of the seats aisle seats, and no middle seats, the airplane would be relatively comfortable.
But a second design option would be a wider six-abreast option which could support a seven-abreast configuration for charter and the domestic Japanese markets. In this case, the fuselage width should be dictated by the narrowest coach seat available (DC-10 and L-1011 10-abreast, 767 8-abreast, or A300 9-abreast). A seven-abreast configuration of these, with the narrowest aisle tolerable (probably 16 inches), would define the cabin width. Then design a six-abreast configuration for the rest of the world.
If the latter option is chose, seat mile efficiency targets should be based on domestic U.S. markets in the six-abreast configuration. This is a challenging target, but should be easier in the 200-250 seat category compared to the 100-200 seat category.
A twin-aisle, six abreast configuration would be much more comfortable than the 757 on transcontinental and transatlantic routes, and with twin-aisles would also have faster boarding and and disembarkment times for short-haul service. It would also allow for more carry-on baggage space, critical in the short-haul market.
Given the breadth of size and range options, two wing configurations should be planned from the beginning, just like the 787. A smaller wing would be used for the 150 seat and possibly the 200 seat domestic version, and a larger wing would be used for the 200 seat extended range version and the 250 seat version.
Another advantage of the six-abreast coach configuration is it allows for a five-abreast U.S. domestic first class and international business class. Almost no one pays for first class tickets in the U.S. These seats are almost always filled with coach ticket travelers who have been upgraded due to premium frequent flier status. For international flights, a four-abreast international first class option would be possible.
Such an aircraft should cover from from the 737-800 to the 757-300 markets. This means a significant change from Boeing's original Y1 100-200 passenger concept. But the reality is a 100 seat aircraft is significantly different from a 200 seat aircraft. What should fill the 100-150 seat category? That will be the subject of my next post.
Part 1 | Part 3 | Part 4
What should a new Boeing 200-250 seat aircraft look like?
A big consideration driving seating arrangements for U.S. domestic airlines is balancing seat revenue with flight attendant requirements. Delta slightly reduced the seating on its 737-800s to 150 seats so they could operate these aircraft with only three flight attendants. 151 passengers requires four flight attendants, as does 200. So a few more fare paying passengers did not offset the added cost of an additional flight attendant. This means Boeing must target designs for 150 seats, 200 seats, and 250 seats in a U.S. domestic two-class arrangement. Alternatively, longer-range international flights have different considerations. This means in a larger, longer-ranged version, total seat numbers are less important.
An almost ideal fuselage for such an airplane would be similar to the proposed Boeing 7J7 and McDonnell Douglas DC-11. Both of these proposed twin-aisle, six-abreast coach configurations.
This seating configuration offers two design options. The first, a narrower option, considers the fact a twin aisle, six-abreat configuration can tolerate narrower seats and aisles. This means the fuselage only has to be about 18 inches wider than the current 737. Despite narrow seats and aisles, with 2/3rds of the seats aisle seats, and no middle seats, the airplane would be relatively comfortable.
But a second design option would be a wider six-abreast option which could support a seven-abreast configuration for charter and the domestic Japanese markets. In this case, the fuselage width should be dictated by the narrowest coach seat available (DC-10 and L-1011 10-abreast, 767 8-abreast, or A300 9-abreast). A seven-abreast configuration of these, with the narrowest aisle tolerable (probably 16 inches), would define the cabin width. Then design a six-abreast configuration for the rest of the world.
If the latter option is chose, seat mile efficiency targets should be based on domestic U.S. markets in the six-abreast configuration. This is a challenging target, but should be easier in the 200-250 seat category compared to the 100-200 seat category.
A twin-aisle, six abreast configuration would be much more comfortable than the 757 on transcontinental and transatlantic routes, and with twin-aisles would also have faster boarding and and disembarkment times for short-haul service. It would also allow for more carry-on baggage space, critical in the short-haul market.
Given the breadth of size and range options, two wing configurations should be planned from the beginning, just like the 787. A smaller wing would be used for the 150 seat and possibly the 200 seat domestic version, and a larger wing would be used for the 200 seat extended range version and the 250 seat version.
Another advantage of the six-abreast coach configuration is it allows for a five-abreast U.S. domestic first class and international business class. Almost no one pays for first class tickets in the U.S. These seats are almost always filled with coach ticket travelers who have been upgraded due to premium frequent flier status. For international flights, a four-abreast international first class option would be possible.
Such an aircraft should cover from from the 737-800 to the 757-300 markets. This means a significant change from Boeing's original Y1 100-200 passenger concept. But the reality is a 100 seat aircraft is significantly different from a 200 seat aircraft. What should fill the 100-150 seat category? That will be the subject of my next post.
Part 1 | Part 3 | Part 4
Saturday, November 25, 2006
What Boeing Needs To Do (Part 1)
I had planned this post after Airbus announced the launch of the A350XWB program. But Airbus, ever dysfunctional, has stalled its decision as it deals with consortium politics.
Assuming Airbus does launch the A350XWB, what should Boeing's next step be?
Boeing currently has a two-prong strategy: Update existing airplanes (737 and 747) with new technology to keep them competitive, and create breakthrough technologies on new airplanes (the 777 and now the 787). With the first 787 now under construction, the question for Boeing is "What comes next?"
A good resource on Boeing's future commercial airplane plans can be found here.
The Boeing Y2 project became the 7E7, which eventually became the 787. Like every Boeing commercial airplane in the last 25 years, the 787 outgrew its original target as a 757 and 767 replacement. Now the smallest 787s (the 787-3 and 787-8) are on par with the 767-300, and the stretched 787-9 has a seating capacity greater than the largest 767, the 767-400ER. At the same time, Boeing has pushed the 737 to near 757 capacity with the latest 737-900.
Most expect Boeing to next launch the Y1, a 737 replacement using composite technology pioneered on the 787. But instead of a 100-200 seat direct 737 replacement, Boeing needs to look instead at follow-on to the 757-200, 757-300, and 767-200 aircraft. For simplicity, I will refer to this market as the 200-250 seat market. This would fill the gap between the 737-900 and the 787. It should also offer the option of a mainline 180-230 seat version to target the 757 market, as well as a smaller, 150-180 seat version to target the upper portion of the 737 market. There should also be an option of a later stretch to 250-280 seats to target the 757-300 and 767-200 markets.
While a U.S. domestic capable aircraft would seem obvious, airlines are increasingly using the 757-200 as a transatlantic aircraft. Continental Airlines currently uses 757-200s in transatlantic service, and Delta will start 757 transatlantic services in 2007. This means a long-range option (transatlantic, at least) is required for a 757 follow-on.
Another factor affecting the 757 replacement market is increasing demand for 757s in charter and cargo service. FedEx plans to acquire 90 757s on the second-hand market. A vibrant second-hand market makes it easier to replace aircraft. These trends, along with airlines retiring 767-200s and redeploying other 767s and some 757s to international service could put pressure on Boeing to bring a 200-250 passenger aircraft to market sooner.
What should a new Boeing 200-250 seat aircraft look like? I'll cover that in my next post.
Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4
Assuming Airbus does launch the A350XWB, what should Boeing's next step be?
Boeing currently has a two-prong strategy: Update existing airplanes (737 and 747) with new technology to keep them competitive, and create breakthrough technologies on new airplanes (the 777 and now the 787). With the first 787 now under construction, the question for Boeing is "What comes next?"
A good resource on Boeing's future commercial airplane plans can be found here.
The Boeing Y2 project became the 7E7, which eventually became the 787. Like every Boeing commercial airplane in the last 25 years, the 787 outgrew its original target as a 757 and 767 replacement. Now the smallest 787s (the 787-3 and 787-8) are on par with the 767-300, and the stretched 787-9 has a seating capacity greater than the largest 767, the 767-400ER. At the same time, Boeing has pushed the 737 to near 757 capacity with the latest 737-900.
Most expect Boeing to next launch the Y1, a 737 replacement using composite technology pioneered on the 787. But instead of a 100-200 seat direct 737 replacement, Boeing needs to look instead at follow-on to the 757-200, 757-300, and 767-200 aircraft. For simplicity, I will refer to this market as the 200-250 seat market. This would fill the gap between the 737-900 and the 787. It should also offer the option of a mainline 180-230 seat version to target the 757 market, as well as a smaller, 150-180 seat version to target the upper portion of the 737 market. There should also be an option of a later stretch to 250-280 seats to target the 757-300 and 767-200 markets.
While a U.S. domestic capable aircraft would seem obvious, airlines are increasingly using the 757-200 as a transatlantic aircraft. Continental Airlines currently uses 757-200s in transatlantic service, and Delta will start 757 transatlantic services in 2007. This means a long-range option (transatlantic, at least) is required for a 757 follow-on.
Another factor affecting the 757 replacement market is increasing demand for 757s in charter and cargo service. FedEx plans to acquire 90 757s on the second-hand market. A vibrant second-hand market makes it easier to replace aircraft. These trends, along with airlines retiring 767-200s and redeploying other 767s and some 757s to international service could put pressure on Boeing to bring a 200-250 passenger aircraft to market sooner.
What should a new Boeing 200-250 seat aircraft look like? I'll cover that in my next post.
Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Airbus' Dillema
What a difference two years makes. Boeing has been on a tear lately, to say the least. At the same time, Airbus has been in free fall.
Here is a brief summary of Airbus' current problems:
What Airbus should have done is recognized the threat of Boeing's big twin, and instead of the A340-500 and A340-600, it should have built a larger, longer-ranged, twin-engined A330 using the wing design of the A340-500/A340-600 and the 777's engines. This would have stalled Boeing's success, and allowed Airbus to offer existing customers a long-range, large capacity aircraft with significant commonality to its existing A330s.
But the past is the past. What is Airbus to do now? There are several options, none of them good.
I was almost certain Airbus would choose option 2. However, Airbus feels an all-new NSR follow-on aircraft for the 737 and A320 market is not viable until around 2014, which means they don't have to make a decision for two to three more years. Because of this, in the next few days Airbus is expected to choose option 3. Even with the NSR pushed out until the middle of the next decade, Airbus has its hands full fixing the A380 and bringing a completely new A350XWB to market by 2012. Not only do they absolutely have to get the A350XWB right, because as soon as it completes its test program they will have to start testing the NSR, but the NSR program must execute flawlessly.
Is Airbus capable of delivering two perfectly executed aircraft programs? We will see.
Here is a brief summary of Airbus' current problems:
- The A380 is two years late, and due to changes in the air travel market, may never reach original sales forecasts. The first A380 cancellation happened when FedEx canceled its cargo A380Fs in favor of Boeing 777s. Another potential A380F customer, Emirates, recently ordered Boeing's new 747-8F freighter.
- Airbus' current large aircraft, the A330 and A340, have been dealt a near-fatal one-two punch by Boeing's 777 and 787. Again Emirates recently canceled its Airbus A340-600HGW order in favor of more Boeing 777-300ERs.
- Airbus' A330/A340 follow-on, the A350, was basically a warmed-over A330 and was so panned by customers Airbus was forced to return to the drawing board to completely redesign the airplane, resulting in the A350XWB.
- The A350XWB engineering effort is directly competing with efforts to address the A380's problems.
- At the same time, Airbus has to plan for the "Airbus NSR", or "New Short Range", the follow-on to the very successful A320 line of mid-sized airliners.
What Airbus should have done is recognized the threat of Boeing's big twin, and instead of the A340-500 and A340-600, it should have built a larger, longer-ranged, twin-engined A330 using the wing design of the A340-500/A340-600 and the 777's engines. This would have stalled Boeing's success, and allowed Airbus to offer existing customers a long-range, large capacity aircraft with significant commonality to its existing A330s.
But the past is the past. What is Airbus to do now? There are several options, none of them good.
- Cancel the A380. Pros: It will likely never break even. It would allow Airbus to concentrate on the A350XWB and NSR. Cons: With 166 orders, Airbus would have to pay out penalties.
- Cancel the A350XWB. Pros: Airbus could fix the A380 and focus on the NSR. Cons: It would cede the most profitable portion of the market to Boeing's 777 and 787, and leave Airbus as a niche player in the wide-body market.
- Go forward with the A380 and A350XWB. Pros: Airbus would remain in the large airplane market. Cons: The A380 will likely not break even, the A350XWB will be too late to market to overcome Boeing's 777 and 787 momentum, and Airbus may cede the narrow-body market to Boeing's 737 follow-on.
I was almost certain Airbus would choose option 2. However, Airbus feels an all-new NSR follow-on aircraft for the 737 and A320 market is not viable until around 2014, which means they don't have to make a decision for two to three more years. Because of this, in the next few days Airbus is expected to choose option 3. Even with the NSR pushed out until the middle of the next decade, Airbus has its hands full fixing the A380 and bringing a completely new A350XWB to market by 2012. Not only do they absolutely have to get the A350XWB right, because as soon as it completes its test program they will have to start testing the NSR, but the NSR program must execute flawlessly.
Is Airbus capable of delivering two perfectly executed aircraft programs? We will see.
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